10 fundamentals for enterprise support

[Glenn Athey] There are some fundamentals of enterprise support that we would do well to remember,  such as knowing your local business base, adopting business-led rather than property-led solutions, and to focus on access to enterprise support rather than dedicated advisors for different types of clients.  This article outlines  10 of the main points to remember for local enterprise support initiatives and strategies.

Recently we’ve witnessed a fundamental review of nationally branded enterprise support, via the removal of Business Link advice and resources on the ground, at the regional level. Local Enterprise Partnerships are getting established, and one of the key challenges is what to do about enterprise support, information and advice on the ground.

Here’s what I think are 10 lessons for local enterprise strategies and initiatives which LEPs and others might think are worth bearing in mind:

1. Know your market. The better you know your existing business base, and the state of entrepreneurship in your area, the better able you are to design appropriate responses, and to identify the main priorities. Bids for LEGI or European funds will need some decent justification and evidence behind them.

2. Remember your existing business base. They may have needs too – in terms of infrastructure, skills or support. It’s important to retain and develop your existing business base as much as it is to seek to create new entrepreneurs. It was often surprising how many LEGI bids failed to mention existing businesses and their needs. For example many LEGI bids focused on building new workspace and premises, when there were known examples of existing industrial estates and local authority owned business premises that were in need of upgrade and refurbishment.

3. Business-led solutions, not property-led ones. It’s striking how many enterprise strategies start with new workspace and premises as a priority, but with little research or justification behind them. But do you really need expensive new premises? Money may be better spent upgrading or improving existing premises. Plus, many new businesses start out in the home. If the type of housing in your area prevents this – then you might have a good rationale for developing workspace. New premises are very expensive, and there’s little proof they will boost enterprise unless there is a proven gap in the local market. Sometimes new premises, such as innovation and technology parks are too expensive for early stage start ups, even if they are knowledge-based.

4. Go to the businesses; don’t expect them to come to you. Related to the above point – the advantages of incubators are over-sold. Why not deliver advice to businesses on their own premises or in their own neighbourhood, rather than on one site? Be prepared to offer services on the doorsteps of neighbourhoods – you need to do this for hard to reach communities and businesses.

5. Make it relevant to business. Businesses don’t put time into something that they can’t understand or see the benefits from. Consult businesses, but keep what you offer simple and straightforward, with the promise of tangible business benefits.

6. Make your services and provision as good as the market, and involve the market. For businesses, the quality benchmark is always the market. You need to ensure that service standards are in line with this. You also need to involve the market. Most businesses will stop using publicly funded support at some stage and start using private services. Private services will always be more sophisticated and technically advanced, so you need to provide early steps into private business support.

7. Focus on ‘enterprising skills’ rather than purely start ups. Enterprising skills such as soft skills in communication and confidence, as well as technical skills such as book keeping – are transferable into employment or other positive outcomes. When we try to advocate enterprise education and start up programmes as purely for business creation, we’re selling them short. We should design transferable skills for enterprise and working in business into enterprise education and skills programmes.

8. Winners can pick themselves. We don’t necessarily need to pick winning sectors and industries. Winners can pick themselves, if the programmes and service offers are right. Initiatives such as the West Midlands Mustard programme in the early 2000s were set up so that growth businesses ‘self select’ or qualify for support based on credible growth ambitions and development needs. And they provided a suite of support that can be tailored or can be ‘pick and mix’ according to the enterprise’s needs. These services were a mix of Business Link, University, specialist industry association and private sector provision. Businesses had to pay £1,000 to subscribe to the Mustard programme to show they were serious about growth – but with the promise of unlocking up to £30,000 worth of support.

9. Don’t slice up your market too much. Different client groups usually want equal access to services, and not necessarily their own custom-made service. There is a basic cocktail of enterprise support tools and issues – which apply to many businesses across sectors and types of owners. Do we really need a separate loan programme each for women, ethnic minority, young, old and disabled owned-businesses? Probably not. We might support and advice more sensitive to their circumstances though, and tailored schemes for Islamic business owners’ finance for example. What’s important is that enterprise support services and programmes are accessed by hard to reach businesses and communities – it’s far less important to have completely separate services, programmes and institutions for different client groups. An example of using more accessible channels for enterprise support was  London’s Faith in Business programme. Faith in Business encouraged, nurtured and sustained entrepreneurship within the African & Caribbean community by reaching them through the Black Majority Churches. It delivered business support from a Christian perspective buying into the faith values and principles of the target community – and it brought mainstream support to these communities too.

10. Build a network, but step back from it. In deprived areas, entrepreneurship can suffer because networks such as friends, family and neighbours aren’t in business, and they don’t know business. Enterprise strategies can help create and develop business networks. However, you can’t control networking and nor should you – you should aim to kick start networks and stand back and let them flourish. We can learn lessons from private sector business networks such as the First Tuesday Network that brings together technology entrepreneurs, financiers and business services providers – all meeting to develop new business ideas, discuss deals and bring new businesses to life. And driven by the maxim of ‘doing business socially.’

 

Why we need an industrial policy

[Glenn Athey] It seems that in the UK our policies have actively promoted certain industries, without this being the explicit goal – for example with the promotion of financial services and consumer and leisure sectors on the back of easy credit and lax regulation and oversight. Its easy to say “leave it to the market” – but can we live with the consequences (as we are doing now). This article takes a balanced look at industrial policy and how it works in some other parts of the world. If we all think that industries such as semiconductors, the internet, mobile telecommunications, medical scanners and vehicles emissions systems are useful and have generated significant wealth and societal benefits, then, as they all benefited substantially from some form of government policy and assistance – we need to acknowledge that governments have a role in the economy and in formulating industrial policy.

Post crisis: the need to create wealth and jobs

In the post recession environment, we need to generate economic growth and new jobs to replace the ones we’ve lost. Governments and concerned citizens are quite rightly concerned about how they will achieve this. This then leads them to think about in which kinds of activities that growth prospects lie, and if they can stimulate growth that goes further and faster than might have ordinarily been the case. High growth firms and global corporations generate wealth, employ lots of people, and generate tax income. If it is not in the national interest to enable and cultivate these benefits, then what is?

And this is where the notion of ‘industrial policy’ comes in – where governments play a role in facilitating or enabling growth in certain growth firms or industries. Think of all the ‘usual suspects’ for case studies in growth, such as Dubai, Finland, Singapore, Silicon Valley and Taiwan. In all cases, governments have played significant roles. Industrial policy is alive and well, and there are successes, despite those who deny government has a role in economic development. As a report from the UK’s National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) recently put it “intervention driving growth is the norm, rather than the exception, in modern economic history.” (Medway and Mateos-Garcia, 2009). Josh Lerner, in his recent book (Lerner, 2010) concluded that appropriate industrial policy is a necessary prerequisite to the development of successful new industries.

The popular misconception about industrial policy

Unfortunately the ‘industrial policy’ brand has been long corrupted as being synonymous with governments ‘picking winners’ and disastrously getting this wrong, often wasting billions in the process. However, for every disaster such as British Leyland, there are also the massive success stories of Silicon Valley and Airbus which have both benefited from a very significant government role. And then there are places such as Singapore and Dubai who have pretty much created successful new economies from nothing over the past fifty years. If we all think that industries such as semiconductors, the internet, mobile telecommunications, medical scanners and vehicles emissions systems are useful and have generated significant wealth and societal benefits, then we need to acknowledge that governments have a role in the economy and in formulating industrial policy.

We need industrial policy to enable recovery from the credit crunch and the recession. Industrial policy has already leapt to the rescue of many banks, with governments taking 80 per cent or even complete ownership. If we think that the financial sector is too big to fail, then surely the means of production and wealth generation are surely too big and important to fail too.

Everyone’s doing industrial policy (even those who deny it)

Often, when you scratch beneath the ‘small government’ rhetoric you can find hefty government interventions in industries. Despite Ronald Reagan’s famously pithy statement that “the nine most terrifying words in the English language are, ‘I’m from the government and I’m here to help’” – his administration did provide a substantial boost to domestic US defense and aerospace industries via a 40 per cent increase in defence spending between 1981 and 1989. Historically, the USA has such an incredibly large track record and legacy on industrial policy, largely founded on the back of significant military and aerospace research contracts.

And then there are the emerging economies, and the large successful companies that are increasing their global presence. Out of the 23 Chinese companies in the 2010 FT 500 list of the biggest companies in the world by market capitalisation, all began as government – owned enterprises, all remain either state owned, state controlled or owned by local government. The largest company in the world by market capitalisation, PetroChina, is Chinese and state-owned.

Can we all agree that semiconductors, the internet, and mobile telecommunications have been beneficial?

Semiconductors, the internet, mobile telecommunications – all technologies and major industries that were spawned from government intervention and industrial policy. And they have changed the economy, and the world for ever. Semiconductors have revolutionised the world economy and have led to such massive technological and industrial change – all increasing the wealth and quality of life of citizens like you and me. Many private companies have benefited from initial government funding and support for these technologies and industries, whether in the form of research grants, favourable tax regimes, or changes to legislation.

Shoot the pork barrel, not the messenger

The trouble with industrial policy is that it is more often than not falls prey to vested interests. Once certain businesses (and their lobbyists) know that there are tax dollars available for business, or that their existing subsidies or special policies are at risk, then they will swing into action to try to capture public funds, or preserve the funding or favours that they have got. They often capture the resources that were meant for something else, or they can be used to prop up industries and ways of doing things that are not in the interests of long term economic growth and development.

Often this is what gives industrial policy a bad name. However, it is the same for every other form of policy. In finance, for example, banks don’t want to be regulated, but they don’t mind it if the state guarantees their losses (as happened in the recent credit crunch). Both education and health sectors are subject to the significant interest and influence of their professional bodies. Energy policy is subject to various industry lobbies, be they nuclear, petrochemical or ecological. So vested interests are a facet of every area of government policy, and are not unique to industrial policy.

Bureaucracy can be helpful, but could probably be improved

Vested interests not necessarily acting in the public interest are often why governments have rules about public assistance to firms and industries. How helpful these rules are to industrial development is an open question, however. For example, the European Union has its State Aid rules which all member countries are expected to follow and are aimed at avoiding conferring commercial advantage to one large company through public expenditure or policy. However existing State Aid rules would not tend to enable what governments in places like the USA, China and Singapore have done to develop new industries. Most western governments have competition policies and watchdogs. Many firms and industrial interests will claim that this bureaucracy is preventing them getting hold of public funding. Whilst it might be bad in terms of closing off a number of policy options, there are also benefits in terms of preventing things like corruption and the protection of vested interests which act to prevent economic development and not promote it. We probably need competition and state aid types of rules but might want to look again at whether they might be improved to better encourage the creation of wealth and new jobs.

Silicon Valley, POSCO, Dubai’s Jebel Ali port, Brazil’s aircraft industry, Taiwan and Singapore’s electronics industries all had significant government interventions…

Silicon Valley is possibly one of the greatest government interventions of all time. As the Council for Industry and Higher Education concluded in their recent policy statement for growth in creative, digital and information technology industries in the UK (CIHE, 2010), the true story of Silicon Valley is one of private equity leveraging intellectual property created by government investment.

Silicon Valley has experienced five phases of development and in each on, public funding was central to success. In phase I, Hewlett Packard and Varian, the Valley’s foundation businesses, benefited from significant increases in demand for electronic products from the UK military during the Korean War. In phase II, the Shockley, Fairchild and Intel semiconductors businesses all made their early business and reputations through military support. Personal computing emerged from the US government funded Advance Research Project Agency (ARPA) which sponsored the first computing programmes at Stanford University. ARPA then funded Unix and the Internet.

Eleven lessons from the past

Josh Lerner, in his recent book (Lerner, 2010) neatly summarises the lessons and pitfalls from industrial policy. Using these lessons, and adding a few of my own observations – I’ve put together 11 lessons for industrial policy below.

1. Industries need a holistic range of favourable conditions to thrive

Governments need to take a broad view. Entrepreneurialism and market activities do not exist in a vacuum. Entrepreneurs need business services, skilled staff, investment finance and customers nearby. Just constructing buildings or science parks does not automatically create an industry. This is why, several years ago, policies started emphasising ‘clusters’ – tacit acknowledgement that a range of supply and demand side factors needed to be in place, and that a healthy and dense set of market interactions and transactions were needed.

2. Building the ‘Field of Dreams’ will only really work once you have a team in place to occupy it

In 2000 the author of this article was undertaking research on the software and games companies in Dundee. I remember these firms being deeply unimpressed with the local science and technology parks. For half the rental cost, and given long lead times to market, they found cheap office space in plentiful supply with all the internet connections they needed. In 2001 the Malaysian government decided to invest $150 million in their ‘Biovalley’ 2,000 acre biotechnology campus, but without much of a domestic biotechnology industry nor any real interest by international investors. By 2005, the site remained empty and the government changed policy and neglected Biovalley.

Buildings are obviously useful, but they are not the anchor nor the initial stimulus to new industrial growth. There needs to be some existing demand and critical mass at the location for such property-led projects to succeed. The new open innovation centre in Glaxo Smithkline in Stevenage, UK sounds interesting in this regard – it is an innovation incubator set within an existing corporate R&D headquarters, with the aim of creating a more fluid range of spin-outs and suppliers of drug discovery R&D.

3. Success often needs to be anchored in locational advantage

Most successful industries or clusters have grown on the back of some kind of major local natural or human assets. In the past 50 years, success in leveraging the academic and scientific research base has led to the development of new global industries and emergence of regions such as Silicon Valley. Taiwan created a semiconductors industry on the back of a successful heavy engineering and engineering design sector.

4. Successful industries work globally

Success needs global approaches. Government regulations, taxes and services need to conform to, or be superior to global standards. Global investors, customers and suppliers are likely to be discouraged if their customary approaches to business cannot be applied in a given nation. For example, New Zealand’s attempts to develop a venture capital industry did not make any progress until they implemented the regulations and conditions of tax liability and ownership that were common in all other nations which had successful global venture capital funding.

5. Industries are not technologies

Successful industries tend to have large ‘footprints’ of activities and supply chains. Technological development and change has helped to form new industries, but then so have consumer behaviours and patterns of demand. To some extent this point is similar to the one NESTA made in its ‘Hidden Innovation’ publication (NESTA, 2007) – that innovation does not equal technology. Policy initiatives such as the UK government’s New Industries New Jobs policies in 2009 to 2010 tended to focus on technology, but arguably didn’t have sufficient focus on the prospects for commercial advantage and capacity. Advanced technology does not always make it to market. There are plenty of examples of technologically superior products which turned out to be inferior in terms of their attractiveness to the market and their commercial returns.

6. Follow and use the market to pursue your policy objectives

Successful industrial policy follows the direction of the market by design. This often involves the development of effective incentives and flexible interventions. Governments should use market knowledge and analysis to guide their investments. Markets respond to market conditions and incentives. Governments should also avoid rigidly designed policies and interventions. Often governments overly prescribe solutions, whereas they are often not well informed enough to design interventions on the ground.

7. Avoid being pressured by vested interests into developing inappropriate policies and activities

All government policy, as well as industrial policy is subject ‘agency problems’ (i.e. vested interests taking over and trying to capture funding). They are universal and governments must take steps to minimise their danger. This is where rules and regulations come in, and the rigorous testing of projects and funding bids for market distortion and prospective economic impacts. It is also where the close scrutiny of existing industries is warranted. In the past, a lot of industrial policy has gone towards keeping outdated industries and industrial practices alive. Whilst this may be necessary in terms of smoothing the structural adjustments in the economy, it cannot last forever. Policies must either try to manage decline or manage transformation and evolution.

8. Evaluation not affirmation

By affirmation I mean the use of descriptive and complimentary case studies which tell a positive story but rarely probe deeply into the performance of industries, firms or initiatives. If we’re serious about really boosting our local economies, then we need to get beyond the gloss and boosterism of affirmative statements. At times like these where public expenditure is under scrutiny, wouldn’t it be helpful to be able to objectively and precisely prove the worth of particular policies and approaches that made a difference to your local and national economy? This is difficult to do unless you have instituted a rigorous and transparent programme of evaluation and can demonstrate you have consistently tried to improve policy and practice over time. To some, this sounds like needless bureaucracy. But to others (the treasury officials), they simply won’t believe your claims and promises unless you have the hard evidence to back it up.

9. The best industrial policies enable industrial development – allowing winners to pick themselves

In their examination of a new approach to supporting growth businesses in the West Midlands (the Mustard Programme), Patton at al (2003) concluded that the best support programmes allowed winners to pick themselves. The role of the public sector was to offer a gateway to support and assistance to firms with growth ambitions, signposting them to both private and public sources of help and support.

The real lesson here is in the enabling role of industrial policy and practice – achieving the right conditions and environment for growth, and building supporting activities to help potential winners to thrive in a competitive environment.

10. Industrial policy by any other name

We often hear about innovation policies, and new initiatives to promote the ‘new economy’, ‘green economy’, or ‘knowledge economy’. Essentially these are all industrial policies. Industrial policy as a concept is broad, and involves the enabling and support of growth and development of existing and new industries.

11. Industrial growth takes a long time and needs consistent, long term support

Lastly and perhaps most significantly, recognise the long lead times for industrial policy. You cannot create new industries and substantive new firms overnight. Regular, substantive changes to policy and support services and institutions will not inspire confidence in your nascent growth industries – they will simply not believe that government is truly committed. The best examples of industrial policy – such as Silicon Valley, Taiwan and Singapore – took many decades for new industries to develop and grow and resemble the mature and world competitive centres they are today.

Creating locational advantage requires local economic development activities

We all know about Richard Florida’s famous line that “innovation is spiky” which reinforces the point that most industries and their supply chains enjoy various kinds of benefits from proximity. Industries and economic specialisms cluster geographically.

And this is where local economic development comes in. Issues of skills provision, infrastructure, and land supply all operate locally. And a major company’s supply chain is likely to be clustered locally or regionally. Local organisations and authorities can and should play a role in industrial policy. They play a critical role in shaping the competitive business environment in their areas, as well as troubleshooting specific problems or challenges.

Long live industrial policy

In a recent debate on the statement by the Economist in June 2010 that “industrial policy always fails”, the reader’s poll indicated that 72 per cent of respondents disagreed with this statement. The general feedback by voters about the debate was that government policies and activities to enable and sustain growth industries were quite diverse, and that governments picking winners and trying to dictate business strategies was now a rare occurrence.

Industrial policy is alive and well, especially in emerging economies, although as noted above it is not often called ‘industrial policy’ these days. Instead we refer to it as innovation policy, the knowledge economy, growth business policy, or as specific industrial initiatives such as ‘stimulating creative industries’.

Doomed to Choose – how we’re making industrial policy choices without often knowing about it

As Dani Rodrik (2006) says – we’re doomed to choose in industrial policy. If we step back and do nothing, and perhaps emphasise free trade, property rights and do not regulate financial markets and property – then its likely that monopoly, rent seeking financiers and property owners will emerge as the dominant economic activity and will disincentivise industrial and scientific development (sound familiar to anyone?).

However – he also says “governments don’t have the requisite information to pick winners but even if they did, they may not have the incentives to do so and if they tried, they would set off powerful rent-seeking behavior that will distort the achievement of the good intentions that motivated them in the first place. The proverbial road to hell is paved with well meaning industrial development plans (p2.) … “Industrial policy is hard, but that is no argument against its use. Fiscal policy, say, or education policy is hard too, but few people would argue that governments should just give up on them. Theory and evidence have convinced us that governments need well designed tax and expenditure programs and that they must invest in human resources. And so it is with industrial policy. Governments need well articulated strategies to provide the specific inputs that markets need in order to foster the structural transformation that drives economic development. ”

One of my personal reflections of the past 20-30 years of the UK is that it has operated a few industrial policies by proxy – support for the defence sector; support for financial services via deregulation and the recent bailouts. And the glut of cheap credit ended up being spent on consumer goods and property which caused a consumer credit and housing boom that turned out to not be sustainable. This has hardly been very strategic, nor has there been a careful consideration of the levers that governments operate.  The result – a serious recession, and a long climb back to prosperity.

Long live industrial policy – ignore or deny it at your peril.

References

Council for Industry and Higher Education (2010) The Fuse – Igniting High Growth for Creative, Digital and Information Technology Industries in the UK, London: CIHE.

Lerner J (2010) Boulevard of Broken Dreams – why public efforts to boost entrepreneurship and venture capital have failed and what to do about it, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Meadway J and Mateos-Garcia J (2009) Demanding Growth: Why the UK needs a recovery plan based on growth and innovation, London: NESTA.

Patton D, Marlow S, Ram M, and Sanghera K (2003) Interpretive analysis as an evaluative tool: the case of Mustard.UK.Com, a high-growth small business programme, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Vol 21(6), pp. 813-824.

 

RDAs – what can we learn?

[Glenn Athey] RDAs probably do not deserve all of the criticism levelled at them, but in my view they were not the best solution to local and regional economic challenges either. RDAs were agencies of central government and that was their fundamental flaw. The big appeal of localism for me personally is being left alone by Whitehall to get on and provide innovative, entrepreneurial solutions to local economic challenges and opportunities. This is why I got involved in local economic development in the first place in the 1990s. On the other hand, what is unappealing is the sheer lack of financial resources. With local authority budgets cut, and approximately 1/3 economic development and regeneration spending retained in the form of RGF, TSB and LEP capacity funding – there is very little funding around.

I think RDAs were ripe for change. If you had asked me in 1998, after completing a Ph.D. on “what makes a best practice economic development agency” I wouldn’t have suggested the RDA model that followed.  I wouldn’t have said that agencies of central government, with ever expanding remits, and ever tightening purse strings were the answer. The most interesting agencies in the 1990s were either those that were entrepreneurial and operated near the market (such as Greater London Enterprise); or those that were government agencies but were all powerful and called the shots (such as Singapore Economic Development Board).

RDAs were central government’s strategic funding bodies. Having worked in two RDAs, there were some very dedicated and professional people who strived to deliver real positive change for local economies. They did some good. However, RDAs were always tied to government targets and directives.

I don’t buy the ‘bureaucratic and inefficient’ accusations. There is no evidence of this. Time and again independent audits and HM Treasury reviews rated RDAs highly compared to other parts of government. The RDA evaluation – probably the most expensive and thorough of its kind – found that RDA cost benefit ratios were at the upper end of the scale, compared to the norms of say, transport project appraisal. Get this – a lot of the money was spent on local projects, led by local partners. People who criticise the evaluation (on very thin evidence) are actually undermining the case for local economic development and regeneration.

 I think the process of RDA abolition was rushed. Far better to have  a proper transition to a local authority driven model, given the time it will take to set up the new fiscal powers.

On balance, I think localism is a good thing - it has far more potential to deliver the truly innovative and entrepreneurial approaches that local economic development needs than RDAs ever did. However, how to do this with so few resources over the next few years is a major challenge.

What can we learn from RDAs and their abolition?

What can we learn from RDAs and their abolition? Several months ago, whilst still working in one of England’s Regional Development Agencies (EEDA), I was asked by the International Consultant Economists’ Association if I could do a presentation about the ‘doing away with’ the RDAs, and to discuss whether they would be missed. I delivered this presentation at the ICEA on 11 October, and again to postgraduate students in the University of Cambridge’s Department of Land Economy.

Of course, since July 2011,  I ceased to work in an RDA. The past few months have provided me with the space and opportunity to reflect on RDAs. The main jist of my presentation was as follows:

MY PERSPECTIVE

  • Its important to ‘fess up to my particular circumstances – I worked in two RDAs – EEDA and LDA, and I worked for a think tank (the Centre for Cities), and Scottish Enterprise. Perhaps more importantly I did a PhD 1995-98 on what development agencies were for and what made a good development agencies.
  • At that time the best agencies were ones that sat between government and business, and could be a bridge and catalyst to economic initiatives and developments. They were open, learning organisations that were entrepreneurial.
  • If you’d have asked me in 1998 whether England’s RDAs should be agencies of Whitehall departments – I’ve have definitely said “no”!
  • Having said that, I enjoyed working in RDAs, and was fortunate to meet and work with some dedicated professional and effective people – who strived to make the best out of the situation and context. I have no regrets about working in RDAs at all, and I learnt a lot.

 BEGINNINGS

  • RDAs were the culmination of 60-odd years of regional policy, and the need to put in place some coherence and strategic sense to the raft of local, regional and national initiatives for enterprise, the economy and regeneration that were around in the mid-1990s
  • RDAs were creatures of Whitehall – arms length agencies, answerable to the Secretary of State and parliament
  • At the start RDAs were no more than administrators of central government grants and initiatives – it took a lot of lobbying and pressure to get them the “single pot” and more

REGIONALISM UNRAVELS

  • There was the 2004 failed referendum for a North East regional assembly, then RDA budget cuts in 2007. But I also think that the Sub National Review vastly inflated expectations for a new ‘localism’ and then dashed them completely.
  • Also – during the credit crunch and recession, RDAs had almost £1 billion removed from their budgets – this mostly took a toll on local projects, including some that were already contractual committments. Local partners were not happy.

THE LACK OF ANY NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY OR INDUSTRIAL POLICY

  • The RDAs were the government’s central plank for diversifying the economy, and for economic development
  • But there was no real national economic strategy of any merit – instead the default lack of strategy resulted in consumer and financial industries (based on the glut of cheap credit) taking the lead
  • RDAs sometimes worked at odds with government – e.g. RDAs championed the commercialisation of innovation and technology, the government implemented a traditional ‘science and technology’ investment approach

(NOT) KEEPING CENTRALISATION AT BAY

  • Despite the ‘single pot’ RDAs still did a lot of activities at the governments bidding (e.g. innovation vouchers, business link, MAS, etc)
  • Certain initiatives such as “solutions for business” effectively re-centralised enterprise support activities and stamped on any scope for local or regional innovation

REASONS FOR ABOLITION

  • I don’t buy the idea that RDAs were wasteful and bureaucratic – time and again audits and studies by HMT and others found RDAs to be amongst the most efficient and effective parts of the government machinery
  • Independent evaluations of impact – came out quite favourably. There have been some claims that the evaluation was not independent nor rigorous. It was commissioned by BIS and cost something like £2 million – an unprecedented level of effort and detail for an evaluation. If this is not regarded as valuable and valid, then its probably best not to evaluate anything ever again and just make up policy on the hoof
  • There is merit in the fact that the goals of regional policy failed – there was not the desired convergence of regional economic performance, many new jobs were in the public sector and ultimately unsustainable
  • As for functional economic areas – there may be some valid points as regions are administrative areas only. But there are also functional administrative areas – it might only make sense to have certain kinds of expertise or capacity at a super-local (or regional) level – such as was done by RDAs for the much applauded strategic transport prioritisation work they did.
  • Perhaps the most valid, yet unsaid, reason for abolition is that, as central government agencies, RDAs lacked the ability to be truly dynamic, innovative and entrepreneurial. Whether its the conditions attached to funding, or whitehall civil servants breathing down your neck and moving the goalposts every year – this is not conducive to the ‘best practice’ models of economic development agencies I had in the late 1990s.

MY VIEWS ON WHAT’S NEXT

  • The money will be missed by local communities – central government money for economic development and regeneration, at my guestimate has been slashed by at least 2/3 (not counting local government’s own cuts). This is unfortunate at a time of great stress for the economy
  • Personally I think that giving local authorities increased powers is a good idea, and removing central government control and interference is also good
  • The proposed new fiscal powers for local government are to be welcomed
  • Although I think that and local economic development activities will not be as effective unless there are complementary national policies and strategies
  • I think that the abrupt abolition and wind down of RDAs was misguided – a transitionary phase into a local authority led model would have been best
  • PS there’s lots of learning from RDAs – look at the impact evaluation, audits – there are all clues to what kinds of activities make the biggest economic impact, what kinds of organisational cultures and behaviours lead to better results
  • All in all – its exciting times to be involved in economic development. Hopefully scope for new thinking, new ideas, and practical action.

WANTED! A new enterpreneurial dynamism for local economic development

[Glenn Athey] There are tremendous challenges facing the UK and world economy. Policy making and policy makers must innovate themselves or become irrelevant. Localism is about rising to this challenge.

The only way forward, with such a lack of public investment, is to become enterpreneurial and broker solutions. Local economic actors and leaders need to become star entrepreneurs, deal makers, innovators, networkers, facilitators, and brokers.

In July, I was asked to speak at an event at The Work Foundation about innovation and cities. Having done some work on this several years ago with NESTA, I summarised that as well as some thinking about how local areas are going to have to deliver change and progress in their economies with not a lot of government funding around. You can view my presentation slides here. In this blog I’ll summarise what’s new in my thinking.

BEYOND PLACE SHAPING

I think we’re well beyond the model of development and regeneration that revolves around property investment, and high levels of public expenditure – typified by the tag “place shaping” often used to summarise the previous government’s approach. For the next few years at least, we need to inject such a level of dynamism and entrepreneurialism into local economic development that has not been seen before.

Once the buzz around new structures such as Local Enterprise Partnerships and Enterprise Zones, and the promised new fiscal tools for local authorities starts to wear off, localities will still need to make positive things happen.

To make progress, leaders will need to prove that they can deliver tangible economic growth and benefits. In the absence of all but the smallest dollops of public cash, they will have to do this via private businesses and the use of existing assets and relationships.

THE NEW REALITIES

First of all, there’s no money – central government funding for subnational economic development and regeneration activities is now at 20% of previous levels.

There’s precious little public capital expenditure – to wave at businesses and to use as incentives.

There are great expectations – of localism and LEPs. Expectations are that they will replace RDAs, despite having only a tiny fraction of the resources, virtually no executive staff, and none of the statutory powers.

Localism is a golden promise. There could be a new era for local economic development. But to make this happen we need local powers and finance ASAP.

The competition is fierce. And its your neighbouring local areas, the devolved nations, BRICS and almost any other nation you could mention. For example, France just announced €35 billion of funding for science and technology.

Big brother isn’t watching you – Whitehall is in the middle of being vastly slimmed down. LEPs and local authorities aren’t as duty bound to follow the same rules as Whitehall (as RDAs were). My advice is to interpret Localism powers as widely as possible. Its a time for trying new things and to abandon the precautionary principal that is tatooed inside every whitehall civil servant’s eyelids.

CAN INNOVATION AND ENTERPRISE HELP?

Place shaping is still important but… we need to RAPIDLY deliver economic development and growth now. The economy has been through the most serious recession since the great depression, and recovery is lacklustre. If we are to undertake any activities to help promote and develop our local economies – they need to make tangible impacts now.

Innovation and enterprise is much more about markets, networks, and relationships.  New ventures – don’t necessarily require expensive new premises or high speed rail (e.g. the IT and computer games cluster in Dundee). We’re in a ‘game changing’ time for people who are involved in developing their local economies. Its not so much about chasing central government cash any more, and ticking the right boxes. Its about creating a reason for your city, county or town to be “sticky” for innovation and entrepreneurs. Each city needs USPs and characteristics that make entrepreneurs and innovators want to stay/come.

More emphasis on services innovation is needed

The UK is an economy which is dominated by service industries. We are constantly harping on about how service industries are our global USP etcetera. Yet there are no active UK policies for innovation in services. Instead we have remained focused on science and technology and the static model of scientific discovery and commercialisation.

Services innovation means innovation through new business models that are flexible and creative.  Innovation in service delivery and new customer interfaces is common – as seen in the use of  new ICT apps and ICT infrastructure. There is also innovation through new service-product offers. Futures, foresight, centres of excellence, and new service launches are often based on radical change.

Services innovation comes about through informality, networking, and interdisciplinary interaction. There is an emphasis on distributed capacity – there are many sectors and many actors.

Services innovation R&D spend and activity are less formal and less tangible.

SERVICES INNOVATION REQUIRES VERY DIFFERENT POLICIES AND ACTIONS TO THOSE FOR TRADITIONAL SCI & TECH BASED INNOVATION ( WHICH IS INCREMENTAL, FORMAL, HAS FEW ACTORS, AND IS BASED ON FOCUSED CAPACITY).

THE WAY FORWARD? A NEW ERA FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN LOCAL AND CITY ECONOMIES

Local economic actors must become entrepreneneurs. When there is little capital, and we need rapid economic growth and recovery, based on the private sector – we will need to emphasise the following factors:

  • CATALYSE: There is a need for entrepreneurial actors in the city or local economy – who can bridge public, private, non profit, education sectors
  • SOCIAL: More emphasis on “people” side of innovation and entrepreneurship – networking, brokerage, deals, forging joint ventures
  • PRIVATE LEVERAGE: clever use of private sector – probono work, networks, CSR, 3rd sector initiatives
  •  MAX EXISTING ASSETS: both hard and soft – underused university/public buildings, diaspora networks, ‘city ambassadors’, new FE college flexibilities

Local economic actors and leaders need to become star…

  • entrepreneurs
  • deal makers
  • innovators
  • networkers
  • facilitators
  • brokers

Of course, local economic actors have long practised this – but mainly towards parts of government to try and unlock and spend public money. Now they need to reorient themselves to private sector entrepreneurs and investors. They have no other choice.

POLICY MAKERS MUST INNOVATE OR BECOME IRRELEVANT

There are tremendous challenges facing the UK economy. Policy making and policy makers must innovate themselves or become irrelevant. Localism is about rising to this challenge.

 

 

 

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